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I. uWHAT RUINOUS MOSAIC":
 
THE FRUITS OF PARANOID EPISTEMOLOGY
 
"Just because you're paranoid don't mean they're not after you... " 
-Kurt Cobain, "Territorial Pissings" 
Gravity's Rainbow is a notoriously unreliable text. The perspectives of the 
strange narrator and various characters give an account of the novel's events that 
is clearly problematic in terms of the degree of "reality" that can be ascribed to 
various episodes: fantasies, hallucinations, and paranoid delusions are often 
indistinguishabl~from the events which may cause them or to which they may 
refer. To an unusual degree, then, the fundamental plot-question-"What 
happens?"-becomes a point of depa.rt"u!e for a sort of textual metaphysics. 
Often, arguments about the significance of passages may be upstaged by 
arguments about the plot itself: what "really" happens and what is illusory? The 
reader faces the same difficulties that plague the characters: all seek knowledge 
of, or at least a coherent theory about, the fictional world of which the characters 
are inhabitants and the reader is a curiously stationed observer. Definitive 
answers are impossible; Pynchon's work revels in its ambiguities. However, 
Gravity's Rainbow is spectacular in the vastness of the fictive world it creates and 
chronicles, prompting a tremendous array of claims about the ways in which it 
functions. Thus, it seems appropriate to inquire into questions which are as 
fundamental in Pynchonian metaphysics as in the IJreal" world. Probably the 
most important question is the one of whether or not ultimate order exists. Is the 
world of the novel orchestrated, ordered, or structured by some outside-the­
System force or basic organizing principle, or is it characterized by randomness, 
with each event falling into a universal Poisson distribution? 
Pynchon's preoccupation with paranoia is perhaps the most important 
hint as to how to interpret traditional ordering strategies. At some point, the 
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epithet of "paranoia" is applied to almost all of the major worldviews portrayed 
in the novel: scientific, mystical, religious, and political. Given the pejorative 
connotation of the term, which is almost always used to dismiss the "paranoid" 
idea, a strong case can be made for reading Gravity's Rainbow as a nihilistic 
refutation of ideas of order, a manifesto for the rejection of the human IIrage for 
order" in favor of a probabilistically oriented take on a universe that is truly 
random and ultimately defeats any attempts to impose structure upon it. 
However, there is also a case to be made for a reading that favors continued 
belief in order oyer such nihilism, one that interprets Pynchon's insistence on 
paranoia as a commentary on epistemology rather than a refutation of actual 
metaphysical structure. To illustrate Ws epistemically oriented dimension of the 
text, it is necessary to examine its treatment of paranoia in both the traditional 
conspiracy-oriented sense and a new sense born of the similarities between such 
raving fears and other, more traditionally approved ways of looking at the 
world. 
Pynchon's fascination with paranoia is unquestionable. The narrator 
provides IIProverbs for Paranoids" that describe the rules of living with illusory 
fears, and most of the major characters are either explicitly called paranoid or 
exhibit tendencies that make the term seem to apply: specifically, a tendency to 
believe that IIThey" are responsible for whatever situation is at hand, to believe 
that events unwind only as IIThey" plan them. IITheir" identity is variable 
enough for the paranoid finger to point at conspiracies at both bureaucratic and 
cosmic levels; IIThey" mete out funding for research programs and govern life 
and death. Yet Pynchon portrays many more common belief systems as being 
11 paranoid" in a similar way. The psychiatrist Pointsman's firm. adherence to 
Pavlovian cause-and-effect dogma ignores the failure of real-world phenomena 
to conform. to its expectations, just as a conventionally paranoid worldview, 
which Pynchon calls a IIThey-system, II refuses to admit evidence against the 
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hypothesized conspiracy. Thus, paranoia comes to be primarily defined not by 
positing a conspiracy against oneself but by insisting on a foregone conclusion 
despite evidence to the contrary. By pointing out the similarities between 
conspiracy theory (III just know They're out to get me ll ) and other irrationally 
maintained belief systems (III just know a Pavlovian causal mechanism is 
operating here ll ), Pynchon effectively extends the definition of paranoia beyond 
the normal conspiracy-centered model. The content of one's conclusions (Le. 
belief in a consp.iracy that doesn't actually exist) is the traditional grounds for 
determining·whether or not a theory is paranoid. Pynchon's redefinition 
demonstrates that the problem of the clinical paranoid is no different than that of 
many others: the lack of a proper justification for the belief. 
According to the conventional definition of paranoia, saying that all 
notions of structure are paranoid is identical to claiming that no structure exists; 
paranoia is supposed to imply falsehood. It is therefore understandable that 
Pynchon can be taken to be making the nihilstic claim against metaphysical 
order. Yet the redefinition of paranoia along epistemological lines means that a 
belief may be simultaneously paranoid and true. 1bis is the most powerful 
argument for structure despite paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow. The best test case is 
protagonist Tyrone Slothrop's constant insistence on the existence of a conspiracy 
surrounding him. His belief is based on intuition rather than evidence; its 
manifestations are as absurd as the imagined demon giving him the finger. Yet it 
is also true that conspiracies do surround Slothrop: the White Visitation 
manipulates him to discover the nature of his link to the Rocket, and his father 
and Dr. Laszlo Jamf conspire to make Infant Tyrone the subject of a psychological 
conditioning experiment. Thus, the evidence bears out his belief in a conspiracy. 
• 
But since his paranoid conclusion is formed before he discovers any evidence to 
suggest its truth, it is simultaneously true and unjustified. 
So far, this only proves that unjustified beliefs may nonetheless be true, 
and therefore that the universe of Gravity's Rainbow may be an ordered one 
despite the fact that each idea of order represented in the novel is exposed as 
being unjustified. Yet Pynchon gives us much more than an ambivalent 
admission of order as an abstract possibility. Indeed, the strange case of a 
completely paranoid scenario that more or less accurately portrays a real 
situation demaI\ds some kind of explanation and is evidence that some kind of 
underlying structure is connecting events. After all, the fact that traditional 
Pavlovian causal explanations cannot ac;count for the correlation between 
Slothrop's erections and V-2 impacts in no way asserts that no other structure­
oriented explanation will suffice: to posit a random, structureless universe 
because current models and theories fail to explain a situation is as unjustified as 
the worst paranoias Pynchon can concoct. Pynchon's skepticism about the 
validity of cause-and-effect reasoning and other typical assumptions makes it 
easy to jump to such nihilistic conclusions: perhaps one reason Pynchon includes 
so many instances of amazing "coincidences" is to reinforce the sense that there 
must be some kind of ordering explanation for the phenomena. For example, 
statistician Roger Mexico charts V-2 impacts, Slothrop's sexual encounters, and 
births in London and finds that all follow Poisson distributions, the expected 
pattern of random events-but all follow the same Poisson distribution, a finding 
that completely defies the expectations of a random, orderless worldview. 
The problem of the corresponding Poisson distributions is especially 
important because Mexico is a part of Pynchon's elaborate comparison of old and 
new paradigms of science and their expectations of order and chaos. Mexico, the 
statistician, eschews the question of explaining causal relationships-whether 
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and why an event happens-and seeks instead to arrange those events which do 
happen into statistaically predictable patterns. His boss, the Pavlovian 
Pointsman, wants to read the mechanisms of the cerebral cortex to predict the 
occurrence of psychological events. The discrepancy in worldviews puts the 
researchers at odds: Mexico insists that the failure of causal thinking requires that 
science "strike off at some other angle", while Pointsman insists that "there is 
only forward-into [true causal explanation]-or backward" (89). Pointsman is 
restricted "to the zero and the one"-an event's occurrence or its failure to occur; 
to Mexico belong all of the probabilities "between zero and one" (55). 
Pointsman's·mechanistic determinism follows the paradigm of Newton as well as 
Pavlov; Mexico's emphasis on statistic~ probability corresponds to the "new 
physics" of Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg. Their conflict 
(excellently detailed in Alan J. Friedman's "Science and Technology") epitomizes 
the one that occurred at the dawn of modem theoretical physics. Of course, we 
know which side prevailed in the mechanistic/ statistical debate in "real" life: 
modem theoretical physics is largely a discussion of probability waves. 
Similarly, Pynchon stacks the deck in favor of young Mexico: not only is the 
unrestricted range of possibilities between zero and one more intuitively 
appealing than Pointsman rigid all-or-nothing analysis, but its resulting Poisson 
distributions are necessary to confirm the existence of the Slothrop-Rocket 
connection. Addressing the same problem, Pointsman's causal approach reveals 
nothing. 
One one level, then, the privileging of Mexico's viewpoint is a refutation 
of traditional ordering strategies: those that operate along the.lines of causality 
and rigid determinism. However, it leaves other important questions rather 
open: does this viewpoint mean that individual events are random and 
unpredictable? The reader is uncertain, and the question has all of the import of 
5 
the assertion that perhaps God really does play dice with the universe. 
• 
Significantly, even Mexico himself is secretly unsatisfied with the answers of his 
mathematical models: he wonders "what ruinous mosaic, facing outward into 
the Waste" of the world, truly encompasses the events he lays out statistically 
(89). 1his imposition of a structure is of course paranoid; the desire to assign 
responsibility even hints at the archetypal paranoia of an invented "They­
system." Thus, even Mexico is not as decisively separated from the rest of the 
novel's paranoid cast as the strictly openminded metaphysics he espouses. 
It is easy.to make Mexico's slip into paranoia an argument against 
structure: we can say that, like other characters, Mexico is rationalizing an 
emotional need for order despite his kI\owledge of the true randomness of the 
universe. As White Visitation researcher Geza R6zsavOlgyi describes the more 
general psychological principle: "The m-sic theory, is, that when given an 
unstrnc-tured stimulus, some shape-less blob of exper-ience, the subject, will seek 
to impose, strnc-ture on it. How, he goes a-bout strnc-turing this blob, will reflect 
his needs, his hopes..." (81, punctuation and emphasis Pynchon's). Mexico, like 
the other characters, can clearly be seen as simply imposing this kind of 
structure. Yet the single Poisson distribution that charts V-2 impacts, Slothrop's 
sexual exploits, and births in London needs explanation, even from Mexico's 
statistical viewpoint: the explanation need not be causal, but it must point toward 
a somewhat connected universe, for the data indicate some sort of correlation. 
To a certain degree, the very existence of this data refutes Mexico's viewpoint, 
with its expectations of randomness; it at least proves that the paranoid's 
insistence on the connectedness of all things is justified in some instances. 
Of course, even without such evidence of connectedness, Slothrop's case­
an intuitively /paranoiacally sensed conspiracy that actually exists- proves that 
an unjustified imposition of structure may actually correspond to an existing 
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order. Besides, Gravity's Rainbow is based around the premise that situations 
generally involve more than initially meets the eye, as evidenced by Pynchon's 
acount of the sinister (and historically accurate) technocracy behind the War (see 
TOlOlyan, "War as Background in Gravity's Rainbow). Faced with the bizarre 
coincidence in Poisson distributions, is a belief in unknown overriding structures 
unjustified after all? Pynchon maintains that Antiparanoia-the belief that 
nothing is connected to anything else-is impossible for the human psyche to 
maintain. Based on this idea and the refutation of so many ideas of order, it is 
easy to revert tQ the assumption that Pynchon is pushing a vision of a "real" 
world that i3 random and structureless while maintaining that human beings are 
simply incapable of facing such a reality as it is. But equally valid is the 
possibility that the traditionally expected orders, such as those of Newtonian 
science, are indeed erroneous, but only because they fail to conform to a true 
order which has;not been-and perhaps cannot be-discovered. 
Molly Hite suggests one possibility in her essay "Gravity's Rainbow as 
Secular History," in which she theorizes that the Rocket's parabolic curve (the 
"gravity's rainbow" of the title) represents a universal pattern of creation, 
expansion and destruction. If the parabola represents a real universal order, it is 
easy to see that many characters-Slothrop, the rocketeer Captain Blicero, and 
the Herero rocket-seeker Enzian-have relationships with it that promise them 
access to whatever truth it offers. If, as the Herero maintain, the Rocket is a sort 
of Kabbalistic Text which reveals the structure and meaning of the universe, the 
message it sends is a grim one, but an ordered one nonetheless: structuring the 
universe in terms of creation, expansion, and entropic heat-death; human life in 
terms of birth, growth, death, and decay; and civilization in terms of ascendency 
and decline. It offers no solution in terms of identifying "Them," but it certainly 
succeeds in structuring the phenomena of the universe in a decisive way. Most 
1
 
importantly, the idea of the Rocket-as-Text shows the epistemological 
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peculiarities of the novel: Slothrop's progress into its mysteries is motivated not 
by any epistemologically sound ideas about the Rocket's significance but by 
intuitive, paranoid feelings of connection with it. 
Of course, it is arguable that schematizing the universe according to the 
Rocket's parabola may simply be another paranoid delusion-Hite herself raises 
the possibility primarily to expose its inadequacies. But the point raised by the 
example, the fact that veridical structures are indeed accessible by 
epistemological strategies typically considered faulty, remains valid. Gravity's 
Rainbow is filled with examples of knowledge gained through unconventional 
means. Dreams, drugs, and seances, aIpong other avenues, appear in the novel 
on the same level with scientific inquiry in terms of their capacity for yielding 
true information (that is, readers have at least as much reason to believe in these 
strategies' results as indicative of what is IJreally happening" in the novel's plot 
as in "scientifically" determined hypotheses). The outstanding example of this 
emphasis on alternative epistemology is Pynchon's account of the chemist 
Kekule von Stradonitz's discovery of the benzene ring, one of the most critical 
developments in the history of chemistry. While Kekule was futilely attempting 
to solve the riddle of benzene's structure, he dreamed of "the Great Serpent 
holding its own tail in its mouth" (412). He then confirmed via experiment that 
benzene exists in a similar ring structure-prompting even Pynchon's eminently 
scientific chemist Laszlo Jamf to invoke the paranoid They-system in asking 
"who, sent, the Dream?" (413). 
This general format, of intuitive, subconscious, and more conventionally 
paranoid revelations taken as indicators of the actual state of the world, holds for 
many situations in the novel: most notably Slothrop's learning of the conspiracies 
surrounding him. However, Gravity's Rainbow's narrative intermingles history, 
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fictional plot, and hallucination. It is often impossible to separate actual 
historical events from those which are unique to the novel; more importantly, it 
is equally impossible to separate these fictional events, which"actually" occur in 
the Pynchonian universe, from the dreams, drug-trips, and imaginations of the 
characters and the narrator. Thus, attempting to validate any epistemological 
strategy becomes a problem: the fact that it seems to yield true results within the 
novel is far from a definitive argument. The fact that Pynchon draws attention to 
Kekule's case, however, offers a better-than-average argument for the validity of 
alternative (anq, by Pynchon's redefinition, paranoid) epistemology: the truth of 
its conclusion, the ring-structure of benzene, is a real-world empirical fact (or as 
close to empirical "fact" as the PynchoI)ian epistemological vacuum allows us to 
arrive). Given this, denying that the novel makes an argument for paranoid 
epistemology as a route to knowledge about real-world structures requires 
radical skepticism, maintaining that not only is the novel's immense discussion 
of The White Visitation, Laszlo Jamf, and all other evidence of the Slothrop­
centered conspiracies fantastic and hallucinatory, but that Kekule's dream­
discovery represents a mere coincidence. 
Ultimately, refusal to accept an overwhelming number of coincidences 
(between Slothrop's paranoia and the conspiracies around him, Kekule's dream 
and the structure of benzene, seemingly unrelated but identical Poisson 
distributions, etc.) is one key to any attempt at characterizing Pynchonian 
metaphysics; the other is recognizing that "paranoid" epistemologies, for all of 
their often-noted distortions of reality, provide the only available insight into the 
ultimate metaphysical questions (and many more immediate empirical 
questions) of the universe's order or lack of order. These distortions, of course, 
make it impossible to characterize whatever overall order may exist-but they do 
not preclude its existence. The novel's insistence on the limited capacities of at. 
least all earthly perspectives means that however veridical its paranoid 
• 
epiphanies may be, the ultimate level of the order-and-chaos question is 
inaccessible. Yet for all of the importance of this limitation, it is equally 
important that Gravity's Rainbow not be read as an assertion of ultimate 
orderlessness. It is one thing to say that Pynchon is suspicious of traditional 
ways of ordering the universe, another to claim that his project is to refute all 
possible conceptions of order. The idea that the first claim entails the second is 
reductive and fails to capture the curiosities that make the novel's metaphysics so 
interesting in tile first place. 
iO 
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II. uBORDERS FALL AWAY": ENTROPY AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 
"The universe is based on sullen entropy-it falls apart as it goes on..." 
-Robyn Hitchcock, "The Devil's Coachman" 
The first paper in this series forwards the notion of Gravity's Rainbow as an 
argument for metaphysical order: it identifies clues of connectedness and 
organization, of a structure revealed through paranoid epiphany. Yet it argues 
for a structure which it cannot detail, an order whose constituent elements it can 
neither identify nor even remotely address. These elements may be material or 
conceptual, and the essay concedes that their manifestations are frequently 
indistinguishable from conventionally paranoid (as opposed to veridically 
paranoid) delusions. Yet just as Pynchon's treatment of paranoia provides a 
springboard for claims of metaphysical connectedness and an overriding 
structure, his treatment of the concept of entropy supplies both questions and 
answers about the degree to which the Pynchonian universe is adequately 
characterized by positing an ultimate connecting structure. To more fully assess 
the novel's position on order, an analysis of entropy, the irreversible dissolution 
of orderings along Time's Arrow, is required. The analysis which follows aims to 
show that entropic "anti-structures" are as essential to Gravity's Rainbow as 
connecting structures and also that these anti-structures serve to limit the 
applicability of any totalizing structures to the novel's world by showing that 
perceptions of structures depend on limited perspectives and can thus never 
capture any objective truth. 
Definitions of entropy vary among disciplines. Most familiar is its use in 
thermodynamics, in which the term denotes the disappearence of differences in 
the amount of heat energy present in various parts of a system: differentiations 
are lost as the chaos of particle movement becomes maximized. Thermodynamic 
systems move irreversibly from heat differentials to a uniform temperature, with 
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new differentials introduced only when heat energy is introduced from outside 
the system. Other disciplines, such as information theory, have borrowed the 
term to describe similar progressions. In the early short story "Entropy," the 
collegiate Pynchon relates the thermodynamic concept to the breakdown of order 
in human lives. Although his introduction to Slow Learner expresses regret at the 
story's technique of creating characters and situations solely as illustrations of the 
sYmbolic entropic force (12), a similar (if more sophisticated) usage persists 
throughout his later work. "Since I wrote this short story, I have kept trying to 
understand entropy," Pynchon writes (Slow Learner 14). In Gravity's Rainbow, the 
parallel between thermodynamics and other systems is typically more tacit, but 
the text is filled with situations to whic}l the concept applies. 
The novel's clearest example of entropy, however divorced from its 
thermodynamic origins, is found in the sociopolitical system of the Zone, the 
tom-up remains;of the Third Reich war state. Geli Tripping points out the results 
of an entropic process to Slothrop in response to his reference to the "Soviet 
zone": "You sound like a German. Forget frontiers now. Forget subdivisions. 
There aren't any" (294). What Tchitcherine calls an "interregnum" in Germany 
has arisen as the Allied Zone-differentiations, like pockets of a substance with a 
variety of temperature gradients, have disappeared, leaving the ultimately 
chaotic Zone. As double agents and black marketeers work the system, 
commodities like information chaotically work their way from person to person, 
like the heat energy transferred from molecule to molecule, until differentials 
exist no longer. As thermodynamics tells us, entropy in a system always 
increases. 
The other argument for analogizing entropy to the sociopolitical, 
economic, and geographical chaos of occupied Germany is that, like all entropy, 
we must discuss it in terms of the system. Pynchon gives almost epic 
\~ 
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descriptions of the bureaucracies that make up the capital-S Systems of the War, 
and the Zone functions in Systematic terms as well. Occupation begins the 
entropic pattern by introducing new political and military elements to the 
German Zone, creating differentials of information, allegiance, and technology 
just as heat energy from outside creates heat differentials in the thermodynamic 
analogue. Even a completely homogeneous substrate, when such forces from 
outside penetrate its System, will exhibit a change that seems counter-entropic: 
heat gradients, or political subdivisions, or demands for previously worthless 
commodities, ~ill reappear, and the System will again be characterized by order­
imposing bureaucracies and hierarchies. However, what has essentially 
happened is that the System which Wa& previously the whole has become part of 
a new System, encompassing the intruders. New gradients form between its 
climate and those of the intruding forces, and these gradients then dissolve until 
maximum entropy is reached or until the System's hierarchies are again altered 
from Outside. 
Of course, the fact that the changing orders of the Zone follow the pattern' 
of entropy says little about the larger metaphysical claims at issue here. 
However, the text's other structured systems seem equally plagued by entropic 
anti-order. Most significantly, the text itself degenerates from a more-or-Iess 
coherent narrative into a scattered mess of tiny sections whose relationship to 
one another is hardly evident. Bits of relevant plot are intermingled with playful 
ruminations on language (liOn the Phrase /Ass Backwards"'), random 
background on characters and events ("Mom Slothrop's Letter to Ambassador 
Kennedy"), and shtick-filled episodes with no narrative relevance to anything 
which precedes or follows them (" A Moment of Fun with Takeshi and Ichizo, the 
Komical Kamikazes"). For all of the paranoid insistence that II everything is 
connected" (703), the novel ends by refuting our expectations about even its own 
connectedness. Before the narrative breakdown begins, the novel makes 
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traditional connections among its subplots, usually based on the relationships of 
the characters to one another and to the Rocket. Slothrop, Blicero, Tchitcherine, 
Katje, PokIer, and the others either encounter one another or move toward the 
Rocket in ways similar enough to justify their inclusion in the same storyline. Yet 
when entropy attacks the novel's structure, connections no longer hold: even the 
final Ascentof the Rocket, which should be the pivotal event in all of the various 
plots, has no obvious effects on most of the characters who have occupied the 
Systems based ~ound it. As in the German Zone, a coherent and connected 
structure is ttltimately unable to maintain itself, and plot-information is scattered 
entropically throughout the Zone of th~ Text's end. 
Of course, given the novel's general mutilinearity, the claim for entropy at 
its end might be contested on the grounds that this chaotic conclusion is simply a 
refutation of expectations of ordered synthesis in a text that is structureless from 
the start. Yet the first three sections of the text are organized and unified in ways 
in which the fourth is not. The first three sections maintain their focus on the 
War, with occasional diversions like Slothrop's dream-trip-through-the-toilet 
always given some sort of connection to the more straightforward plotlines. 
These lines are also connected in time: they all connect to the War, occurring 
roughly contemporaneously if separately. By Part 4, some segments display only 
remote thematic connection: the characters and events chronicled no longer seem 
to occupy the same fictional space as those which precede them. The textual 
system has moved outward, forward and back in time, and abandoned its earlier 
rules. Slothrop is no longer a distinct character at all, the importance of Rcoket 
00000 is downplayed, and bits like the conspiracy-oriented story of Byron the 
Bulb show only thematic connections to the plot which has until this point 
connected the narrative. 
• 
Pynchon's portrayal of such connected structures' inability to remain 
intact is equally important within the events the narrative chronicles. In one of 
the most bizarre developments in the novel, protagonist Tyrone Slothrop himself 
undergoes a type of entropic scattering, the relevance of which is emphasized by 
the fact that the narrator announces it in terms of a plan of connectedness gone 
wrong: "Tyrone Slothrop...was sent into the Zone to be present at his own 
assembly...and there ought to be a punch line to it, but there isn't. The plan went 
wrong. He is being broken down instead, and scattered" (738). Other characters 
suddenly have trouble remembering Slothrop "even as a concept-'it just got too 
remote"s what they usually say" (740). Theories are raised about Slothrop­
fragments growing into new individuals, but his dissolution ultimately remains a 
mystery. However we interpret it, this instance of entropy speaks powerfully 
against ideas of connectedness. Here, it is the structure of the Self, a basic 
element in metaphysically oriented discussions, that cannot maintain itself. How 
can we believe in the veridicality of the paranoid insistence on the connectedness 
of all things when even personal unity-the most basic of presumably connected 
Systems- is subject to omnipresent entropy? 
What these entropic elements of the text ultimately give us is an assertion 
that, in Yeats' words, "Things fall apart; the center cannot hold." Molly Hite has 
demonstrated the ways in which Pynchon's work withholds the "holy center" of 
meaning-"a central insight that is unaccountably missing from Pynchon's 
fictional worlds"-from its readers, systematically depriving us of a "real" story 
(10-11). To use Pynchon's physics-oriented description of such epistemic 
situations, we are always ~t away from actual knowledge. This is reminiscent, of 
course, of the Derridean idea of the center as the unattainable position of the 
"transcendental signified" to which all of the text's signs aspire but which they 
can never reach. Indeed, Gravity's Rainbow is a deconstructionist's dream, 
•
 
repeatedly drawing our attention to the fact that everything is a text, an act of 
discourse. To the Herero, the Rocket is a Kabbalistic Holy Text; Pointsman reads 
the cerebral cortex, Mexico the Poisson distributions of the Blitz and Slothrop's 
amorous escapades. The various "texts" which appear to Slothrop are too 
numerous to list, but by novel's end he is an accomplished reader of all 
conceivable signifiers: "he reads the guts of trout he's caught and cleaned, scraps 
of lost paper, graffiti on the broken walls where facing has been shot away to 
reveal the brick underneath-broken away in specific shapes that may also be 
read ... "(623, ~llipses Pynchon's). 
Amid this mess of signifiers, as Hite shows, no center of meaning emerges. 
Moreover, the problematic state of the structure of textual meaning is also the 
state of metaphysical enquiry in Gravity's Rainbow. However convincing we find 
the empirical argument for order in Pynchon's universe (coinciding Poisson 
distributions, et'.), notions of structure collapse when no center can be posited 
around which the structure can be organized. In "Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences," Derrida points out the reliance of posited 
structures on a center "to orient, balance, and organize the structure--one cannot 
in fact conceive of an unorganized structure....even today the notion of a 
structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself" (960). Given the 
way in which the novel treats the absent "holy center" as the key to any proper 
structuring of reality, Pynchon seems to share Derrida's belief in this reliance. 
While Derrida's remarks are ultimately aimed at the problems of structuralism in 
critical theory, they are clearly relevant to the problems of basic metaphysics: 
...the whole history of the concept of structure...must be thought of 
as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of 
determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated 
fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of 
metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these 
ib 
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metaphors and metonymies... It would be possible to show that all 
of the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center 
have always designated the constant of a presence-eidos, arche, 
telos, energeia,ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so 
forth. (Derrida 960-1, ellipses mine) 
It seems clear that the metaphysics of Pynchon's paranoids fits into the 
same pattern, its salient feature its centering of itself around uTheir U presence. If 
we treat the paranoid assertion of metaphysical order as merely another 
manifestation within this useries of substitutions," it is difficult to see why it 
should be privileged. The argument offered by the first essay rests on the 
conformity Qf Pynchon's world with paranoid epistemology. The "Mystery 
Insights" (691) of Slothrop and the novel's other paranoids serve the same role as 
the prophesies and miracles·of any religious metaphysics: outside of personal 
revelation, little separates Slothrop from his Calvinist heritage, "his own WASPs 
in buckled black, who heard God clamoring to them in every turn of a leaf" (281). 
Whatever fruits paranoid epistemology may bear, the argument for structure 
depends on this faith in miraculous revelation-and entropy, with its insistence . 
that real structures are temporary at best and perpetually unstructure 
themselves, is as critical to the text as the paranoid connectedness which it 
opposes. 
Entropy implies more than the temporary nature of earthly structures, 
however. If we accept Derrida's assertion that structure relies on centeredness, 
then the novel's Systems can only properly said to be structured if they have 
centers. In two important ways, entropy destroys systems' centeredness. First, 
while a center is defined by its distinctness from the marginal System oriented 
around it, entropic decay entails the erasing of these distinctions, the hierarchies 
which define centeredness toppling as the System reaches homogeneity. Second, 
as self-contained Systems invade one another to become part of new and larger 
Systems, original centers become immediately marginal. The perpetual 
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redefinition required by entropic change emphasizes the fact that centers are 
defined by the marginal Systems around them even as they supposedly organize 
and define these margins. If entropy affects all structures, their centers are 
centers only because of the limited way in which the structure is perceived. 
Inclusion of a wider perspective, taking into account the effects of factors outside 
the proposed structure or of entropy within the structure over time, reveals that 
the identification of the center is contingent on one's perspective of the system. 
For eXaDJ.ple, the Zone is defined with the Rocket as its center. Blicero's 
position of power comes from his access to the Rocket, and the various Rocket­
seekers are measured by their relative proximities to and distances from it. 
Within the novel's Part 3, "In the Zone," the Rocket OOOOO-as-center holds, for the 
distinctions show minimal change. Yet in Part 4,"The Counterforce," we are 
forced to reevaluate this center as the narrator fast-forwards to show the world's 
political and technocratic systems at a later stage. End-of-the-War Europe, 
defined by the 00000, is juxtaposed with a movie theater managed by a caricature 
of Nixon named Richard M. Zhlubb and menaced by a decidedly more 
threatening missile. Given twenty-some years of change in power structures in 
which the German Zone is absorbed into the larger political system of the Cold 
War and the German Rocket-quest supplanted by the new technocratic center of 
nuclear weaponry, Blicero's Rocket seems marginal even as it sends Gottfried to 
his death. Suddenly, we view its role not as central but as significant in its 
parallels to the new apocalyptic center, the missile about to strike Dick Zhlubb's 
Los Angeles. 
The other way in which entropy puts ideas of structuredness into 
question, the dissociation of a supposed center and the consequent change in its 
system's structure, is exemplified through Slothrop's dissolution. Throughout 
the early stages of the novel, Slothrop and his eerie Rocket-connection are at the 
center of a systematic observation by The White Visitation-a system made 
meaningless when he dissipates. We see some of the players in this system 
trying to maintain its order by chasing Slothrop's ghost-Mexico, for instance, is 
"unwilling to give him up." However, other accounts after Slothrop's dispersal 
illustrate that even this most well-defined of the text's systems is centered around 
Slothrop only from a certain perspective. "We were never really that concerned 
with Slothrop qua Slothrop," a "spokesman for the Counterforce" tells the Wall 
Street Journal (7,38). Even the text itself, in which Slothrop is the most"centered" 
figure, continues without him. 
Such entropic events make no d~finitivestatement about ultimate 
metaphysical order, but they do draw attention to the fact that Pynchon gives us 
no structure which is not subject to entropic change over time, no order which 
persists or provides a basis for positing a totalizing structure for his fictive world. 
The connections attributed to J/Mystery Insight, II which are the basis for the 
argument of the first essay, may reveal an inability to understand the reasons for· 
certain phenomena-but this does not in itself require a belief in an overriding 
structure to accommodate them. Instead, the dependence of ideas of 
structuredness on perspective demonstrates that Gravity's Rainbow actually 
supports a relativistic worldview. For example, we can order the Zone around 
the 00000 or the White Visitation's efforts around Slothrop within a limited 
perspective, but we must acknowledge that from other perspectives these 
attempts at structure collapse. Instead of hints at meaning, order, or truth, our 
perceptions of structuredness actually emphasize our inability to achieve any 
kind of universal or transcendent knowledge: all is relative and contingent on 
perspective. 
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In fact, this inability explains the paranoid insistence on a They-system. IT 
the center of the paranoid's ultimate structure is centered around a presence 
which is by definition unknowable, it can never be refuted, or even found to be 
limited to relative "truth." No matter what evidence is forwarded to 
demonstrate the relative nature of order and truth, it is imaginable that our 
inability to transcend the relative is due to the fact that this is the way that They 
want it. As Mark Richard Siegel notes, even the entropic ruin of structures can be 
explained away as "the central element of [Their] cosmic conspiracy" (150). 
When the very ~oncept of structure itself is shown to be dependent on a center, 
which is in turn determined by perspective, one can attribute metaphysical 
reality only to a structure whose center.can never be perceived at all. Indeed, the 
text suggests that the They-system of its paranoids shifts outward as it goes on, 
moving away from bureaucratic and political conspiracy theory to metaphysical 
claims. In the early references to "Them," Pirate Prentice and, later, Slothrop 
clearly refer to "The Firm." Only as this limited System seems incapable of 
explaining the novel's events is the pronoun shifted to indicate an all­
encompassing conspiracy. This shift is indicative not of the revelatory paranoid 
epistemologies lauded by the first essay, but rather the problematic conspiracy 
theory which "paranoia" usually denotes. The "They-system," adopted 
eventually even by the narrator, never provides a scheme of connectedness for 
the novel's events with any notable explanatory appeal; instead of fitting the 
pieces of the PYnchonian world-puzzle together, They provide only an excuse for 
insisting that the pieces do somehow fit together. 
PYnchon's relativist stance on human knowledge, especially as it relates to 
the change of systems along Time's Arrow, is emphasized in the motif of"Llt." 
Using the physicist's notation for temporal change, Gravity's Rainbow points out 
many of the problems time presents for knowledge. The Llt between frames of 
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film, for instance, represents time uncaptured and unobservable. Given 
knowledge of only particular segments of time, attempting to achieve more 
general knowledge is impossible. For instance, Franz PokIer, allowed only one 
annual visit with his daughter, realizes that he cannot confirm the girl's 
identity-he cannot know if she is his child or even if the same child returns from 
one year to the next. lhrough such situations, At comes to represent the 
epistemic difficulty which attends humans' limited perspective. 
Of course, given the entropic and epistemic situation, "Mystery Insight" 
and the occasional triumphs which the first essay uses to argue for its efficacy are 
not much worse off than any other epistemological strategy. The novel's 
relativism, however, insists both that ~e world's systems shift and decay around 
us and that their alignment and structure depend on our perspective in the first 
place. With this background in place, it seems clear that Gravity's Rainbow is no 
affirmation of mystical paranoia as an avenue In to a holy center of metaphysical 
knowledge. The first essay is correct insofar as it recognizes Pynchon's critique 
of traditional means of knowledge, but it too readily endorses the paranoid 
enterprise as an answer. The subject of metaphysical order in Pynchon's world is 
more complex than analyzing evidence for whether or not it exists; the novel is 
deeply concerned, like Derrida, with ways in which our perspectives of 
structures influence our belief in them and our identification of the centers which 
define them. The relativism appropriate to Pynchon's entropically changing and 
perspective-dependent world offers less in the way of knowledge than the less 
skeptical viewpoint of the first essay; coupled with the novel's apocalyptic bent, 
it allows little comfort in our interpretation. However, accuracy, not comfort, is 
our objective, and this relativism most properly indicates the emphasis of 
Gravity's Rainbow's metaphysics. 
III. iiAN ELLIPSE OF UNCERTAINTY":
 
THE READER AND THE ORDER-CHAOS DIALECTIC
 
"You can add up the parts but you won't have the sum..."-Leonard Cohen, "Anthem" 
The first two essays in this series take issue with one another in their 
readings of the metaphysics of Gravity's Rainbow based on their identification and 
promotion of different themes of the text. According to the first, an adequate 
characterization of the Pynchonian universe must take note of the success of 
paranoid epistemologies in identifying features of the textual world. This 
reading is both empirical and mystical, emphasizing the need to address events 
and phenomena but recognizing that standard ideas of justification for belief fail 
to accomplish this task. The second essay subordinates this empirical emphasis 
on individual plot events to a relativistic framework by using the concept of 
entropy to argue that the novel exposes its structures and their centers as 
dependent on liInited perspectives. It seems that each has something important 
to say, but the difficulties in reconciling them are prodigious. Both identify 
tendencies in the novel which cannot coexist without a degree of paradox, each 
describing important features in the text which cannot be accommodated into the 
worldview of the other. IT this is true, we cannot read Pynchon's engagement 
with ideas of metaphysical order and orderlessness as a complete argument for 
one way of perceiving the universe. The question, then, becomes one of 
establishing the relationship between the simulataneous promotion and 
refutation of ideas of order within the text. A wide variety of critical approaches 
might be applied. The formalist-influenced critic, for instance, might argue that 
the entropic breakdown of the text in Part 4 resolves the tension between order 
and chaos in favor of the relativist worldview; the deconstructionist might 
analyze the hierarchy of these opposing concepts and the ways in which the text 
subverts it. 
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Excellent arguments could be made for these and other interpretations, 
but perhaps the most interesting take on the dialectic of structure and 
structurelessness is the model set up by reader-response criticism. Concern with 
metaphysical order entails an interest in interpreting the world. The earlier 
essays debate whether or not the interpretive moves of paranoid characters, with 
their conclusions of connectedness and They-systems, are legitimate, and 
therefore whether the proper reader's response is one of assenting or objecting to 
such interpretations. The characters' metaphysical readings of the world are 
thus, by all accQunts, inextricably tied to the reading of the novel. With this 
connection in mind, a number of issues about interpretation and the discovery or 
imposition of order arise. Here, I argu~ not only that Pynchon's double-sided 
presentation of metaphysical order and orderlessness is an issue to be resolved 
by the reader, but that this presentation results in a parallel in the order-seeking 
of readers and characters by creating the same dynamic of epistemological 
difficulty in the corresponding searches for structure in the novel's world and in 
the text itself. 
Before examining this parallel in detail, it seems fruitful to examine the 
exact problem posed by the opposing readings of the earlier essays. The first 
essay points out the successes of paranoid epistemology which the relativist 
paradigm of the second essay cannot accept as being privileged outside of a 
certain perspective. On the one hand, the paranoia of Slothrop and others 
reflects structures in the text, like the conspiracies around Slothrop, in such a way 
that its potential for discovering true order seems privileged. On the other, the 
relativism suggested by entropic change is unable to accommodate this 
privileging, because it insists that "true order" is true only within a certain 
context and from a certain perspective. Yet to place the remarkable efficacy of 
paranoid epistemology within the relativist framework is to say that its 
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revelatory power is no more or less correct than any other strategy; the amount 
of "truth" it reveals is no longer a valid criterion for evaluating it. In 
characterizing the novel's world, we want to capture both the privileging of 
paranoia and the circumstances which subvert it by necessitating a relativist 
worldview-but these two elements of the text contradict in a direct and 
unavoidable way. 
One way to attempt to resolve the pro-paranoid thesis and the relativist 
antithesis is to separate them into different spheres. We might say that paranoid 
epistemology is privileged in a pragmatic framework concerned with empirical 
phenomena-and events, but that limited perspective makes it as problematic as 
any other strategy within the framework of ultimate metaphysical inquiry. 
However, this attempt at resolving the paradox neglects the fact that it is 
empirical, "real-world" systems, such as the German Zone and its Rocket­
technocracy, whose entropic change and resulting perspective-dependence make 
relativism necessary in the first place. 
Given the fact that this paradox is unavoidable, the relevant issue is the 
way in which it functions in the novel. To begin addressing this matter, it is 
helpful to examine which sections of text support the claims in question. The 
citations from the novel of the two previous essays illustrate that their 
contradictory theses draw their primary support from different sections of the 
text. Evidence for the efficacy of paranoid epistemology comes primarily from 
the first two sections, while support for the claims about relativism comes from 
the final section. In fact, the text bears out the pattern this suggests, fostering 
expectations of connectedness in its first sections, then engendering suspicion of 
these expectations as it becomes clear that no resolution is forthcoming. 
The novel begins like many others, with different subplots which seem 
that they may be easily integrated at some point and with plot-questions which 
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seem that they may be resolved. Accustomed to novels which draw separate 
plot-threads together, the uninitiated reader has every reason to expect synthesis, 
and the novel plays on this expectation. As Slothrop traverses Europe in search 
of the Rocket to which he is so intimately and mysteriously tied, we expect an 
encounter which will explain this connection. As the various bureaucracies (The 
White Visitation, Pirate Preritice's Special Operations Executive, IG Farben, the 
German rocket research establishment) are developed, we expect that their role 
will be explained. Approximately the first half of the novel complies with these 
expectations, re.vealing bits of seemingly central information with real promise 
for resolving and ordering the textual puzzles which entice us to keep reading. 
When we learn of Infant Tyrone's role i,n Dr. Laszlo Jamf's experiments, we 
expect that this information will sooner or later playa role in explaining 
Slothrop's Rocket-erections. Connections and structures build, with the Rocket 
as their usual center, connecting the companies and researchers who have 
produced its plastics and fuels, the enigmatic Captain Blicero who wields its 
power, and its various seekers like Slothrop, Tchitcherine, and Enzian. 
Thus, as Slothrop enters the Zone, virtually all of the novel seems to fall 
into a tremendously complicated but nonetheless coherent plot which, given 
some time, could be mapped out. Yet Slothrop's progress through the Zone is 
accompanied by a textual shift-connections are drawn less clearly, more 
marginal events take over the narrative, and the gradual decline into textual 
entropy begins. Yet as this all happens, invocations of Them and Their mastery 
over a supposed structure become more and more prevalent: the more 
phenomena defy conventional explanation, the more the paranoid seems 
prompted to point to Them as the answer. In the early sections, when They need 
only be highly stationed bureaucrats, the paranoid's ideas of order are 
plausible-how many of us have our own possibly paranoid ideas about The 
System, The Man, or The Powers That Be? By the time we are told that it is 
"within Their power to go on forever"-to transcend death and the other 
entropies which can then be explained as Theirs, the reader is, like the characters, 
floundering as expectations of connectedness and ideas of order are thwarted; 
the epistemic ground formed by our half-formed ideas about the resolution of 
plot-issues, has been pulled out from under our feet. 
The progression of the text as a whole, then, seems to follow a pattern not 
unlike the one Stanley Fish has identified in individual sentences and lines of 
verse, in which.the reader is led to form a conclusion which is promptly 
subverted by what follows (Culler 65). In Gravity's Rainbow, the reader is never 
allowed any definitive conclusions; Py;nchon subverts expectations of 
connectedness and coherence instead. We expect a solution to the Slothrop­
Rocket connection, for instance, and instead witness not just a failure to reach this 
solution but the dissolution of the character who defines the problem in the first 
place. Paranoid ideas of order-the only ideas of order available-seem more 
and more ridiculous. They are even treated as a ludicrous game in which Pirate . 
Prentice is able to coach "novice" paranoid Roger Mexico, both of them agreeing 
to play despite their admission that even the game's only real end is defined by 
Osbie Feel's desire to 1/ piss on Their rational arrangements" (639). Instead of the 
Mystery Insights ascribed to paranoia earlier on, we see a pathetic attempt at 
escape from a world whose orderlessness only grows more evident. 
At the same time, however, the reader has been shown time and time 
again, as the first essay demonstrates, that paranoia has sometimes been "a route 
In for those...who are held at the edge" (703, ellipses mine). By means of 
paranoid epistemology, Slothrop has discovered the conspiracy surrounding 
him, and Kekule has discovered the structure of benzene. The refutation of order 
accomplished in the text's entropic end is always qualified by the possibility, 
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however unlikely, that They really exist and are arranging things. Hthe reader's 
own paranoid inclinations were not wooed throughout the novel, its ending 
would be precisely the manifesto of relativism which the second essay promotes. 
Instead, the text's relentless promotion of paranoia's possibilities means that the 
reader is moved not only to skepticism about order because of entropy and 
perspective-dependence, but to a sort of counter-skepticism about this relativism 
itself, an unshakable idea that perhaps the denial of absolute truth, order, and 
meaning is missing something. Relativism certainly creates an epistemological 
vacuum in which nothing can be proven, but a relativism which is itself drawn 
into question creates another sort of uncertainty. The reader, like the characters, 
is bombarded with contradictory tende;ncies in the novel's fictive world and put 
into an epistemological situation which cannot be comfortably resolved by 
adopting the relativist worldview. Acceptance of paranoid truth is naive, but 
complete denial:of its possibilities is reductive. 
This identification of the reader's experience with that of the characters, 
based on their parallels in interpretive moves thwarted by an epistemological 
vacuum leaving ultimate uncertainty, is also supported by direct invocations of 
the reader and of the reading process. The narrator occasionally addresses the 
reader directly, usually responding to her lack of information. Sometimes these 
addresses acquiesce and tell us what we want to know: "You will want cause and 
effect. All right" (663). Elsewhere, they refuse, perpetuating rather than easing 
the reader's epistemic plight: "_say what? what's Slothrop's own gift and Fatal 
Flaw? Aw, c'mon-" (676). In both cases, the voice of the narrative is conscious 
of its own difficulties for the reader and of the fact that it controls her access to 
information. Its emphasis of this fact stresses that for all of the amazing amount 
of information contained in Gravity's Rainbow, much is still withheld from the 
reader-drawing our attention once more to the uncertainty the novel produces 
in its readers. We may even say that such direct invocation of the reader 
periodically brings her into the text as a character denoted by the second-person 
pronoun, with this perpetual uncertainty as her only given trait. 
This parallel between the reader's interpretation of the text and the 
characters' interpretation of their world is made explicit insofar as the characters' 
interpretation of empirical data is frequently called "reading," from the Herero 
readings of the Rocket-as-Text to Pointsman's readings of the cerebral cortex. 
Even minor characters such as Army barber Eddie Pensiero have their own 
peculiar texts: ",Eddie is a connoisseur of shivers. He is even able, in some 
strange wa~ to read them, like Saure Bummer reads reefers, like Miklos Thanatz 
reads whip-scars" (641). The usual dif~erence between textual interpretation (the 
decoding of the words of a text and the attribution of a meaning or significance to 
them) and empirical interpretation (the analysis of data and formulation of 
hypotheses based on this data) is effectively erased. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to say that it is readings and readers who "move in an ellipse of 
Uncertainty" (427). H Gravity's Rainbow is about the epistemological difficulties 
inherent in making correct judgments about metaphysical reality, it seems to 
include the reader's attempts to make correct judgments about texts-to reach 
Molly Hite's "holy center" of meaning-within this species of interpretive acts. 
This essential similarity of interpretive acts explains and justifies what 
may initially appear to be an unjustified conflation in the second essay of the 
structure of the universe which the novel portrays and the structure of the novel 
itself. The essay uses the entropic degeneration of the text itself to argue for the 
appropriateness of applying the concept of entropy to the situations and events 
faced by the characters within the novel's fictive universe. Yet if the interpretive 
enterprises of reader and character are essentially the same, the disintegration of 
the text is more than just a case of the novel's form running parallel to its content 
(the entropic change of Slothrop, the Zone, and the Rocket-technocracy). It is a 
case of form building on content and emphasizing it in an important way. Each 
epistemological roadblock set before a character (e.g. PokIer's inability to identify 
his daughter based on disconnected, isolated moments) has the same effect on 
the reader; each time a character's capacity for accessing truth is denied, the 
reader's is denied as well. The novel is engineered so that our confrontation with 
the issue of the daughter's identity involves only the same information available 
to PokIer himself. In most instances, then, the difficulties encountered by reader 
and character are not merely parallel, so that tales of epistemic uncertainty might 
be read as an allegory of the reading process, a typical conclusion of reader­
response criticism. Here, reader and cl}aracter face the same dilemma: the 
reader's additional peril of the degenerating text is simply another instance of the 
kind of problems that elsewhere wreak their epistemic havoc on both sides of the 
form/ content divide. 
The fact that Pynchon so neatly bridges the gap between form and content 
is particularly significant in the relationship of questions about the novel's formal 
structure to those about metaphysical structure in its fictive universe. Because 
the centers of structures within the novel are identical to the centers around 
which we might attempt to orient a proposed structure of the text, Gravity's 
Rainbow's refusal to resolve issues of metaphysical structure simultaneously 
prevents the resolution of the question of its own formal structuredness. When 
entropic change reveals the fact that Slothrop and the Rocket serve as the centers 
of systems only from a certain perspective, their roles as centers of plot and 
theme are equally at issue; the same epistemological problem of perspective­
dependence which can marginalize these would-be centers of metaphysical 
structures entails that the structure of the novel itself is equally perspective­
dependent. For instance, when Slothrop dissipates and the Counterforce 
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announces that it was never "concerned with Slothrop-qua-Slothrop," we also see 
that the novel too can continue without him and even without traditional 
assumptions about character and plot. Like the attempt to find a satisfactory 
center for metaphysical structures within the text, the effort to locate a 
satisfactory center for the text itself can yield only arbitrary and ultimately 
unsatisfactory answers. 
Again, however, the paranoid They-system introduces an irrefutable 
possibility which adds to the complexity of the issues of metaphysical and textual 
structure. By virtue of Their very inaccessibility, Their presence can never be 
shown to be·perspective-dependent, and a structuring of the novel's universe or 
of the text around this presence can never be refuted. Its epistemic unsoundness, 
of course, can be demonstrated-but as the first essay illustrates, the difference 
between soundness and truth is considerable. The stakes of uncertainty are 
raised with respect to the text's own structurality just as they are in the 
metaphysics of the Pynchonian universe. Given only the relativism of the second 
essay, we would be forced to say that the novel lacks a true structure because all . 
of its possible centers are undercut; considering also the imposibility of 
relativizing an inaccessible presence, the novel's structurality is made 
indeterminate but They provide a possible center which is never fully refutable. 
The novel can always be read as an account of Their successful effort to withhold 
knowledge from those who seek it, its structure defined around Their presence 
and designed to accomplish Their ends. 
Given a dialectic so impossible to resolve, it is entirely possible to continue 
this back-and-forth analysis ad nauseam. Such is the circle of argument embodied 
in Gravity's Rainbow. In the text's metaphysics and again at the level of the text 
itself, ideas of structure are simultaneously undercut and sustained, always 
providing an argument for each side of the dialectical opposition. The reader of 
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the novel, like the characters within its world, is at best able to identify the nature 
of the circle in which she and they are caught, a circle with its roots in the 
epistemological problem posed by the human inability to transcend a limited 
perspective. In this circle, proof of structure is as impossible as proof of 
structurelessness. To ask for more resolution than this is as hopeless as asking 
for the circle's origin or its terminus. The closest we can come to a real "Mystery . 
Insight" from the reader's point of view is an acknowledgement that maintaining 
the circle itself is the real achievement of Gravity's Rainbow's metaphysics and 
textual structure-it keeps us spinning around inside, overcoming our best 
efforts to break free. 
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